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1. Introduction
Concern about global warming is everywhere. It is one of the 
highest risks humanity has faced in the last years, and, in many 
senses, it makes people reconsider their relationship to nature 
(Shogren, 2002b). Affected decisions encompass many aspects 
such as buying green cars, switching to more efficient energy, 
donating to an environmental organization to offset the carbon 
footprint, etc. One popular approach to achieve control over, 
and potentially reduce, CO2 emissions is through a cap-and-
trade system of carbon allowances. Examples of these systems 
are the mandatory caps European Trading Scheme and the vol-
untary caps Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) trading system.
In addition to carbon allowances, the CCX trades carbon off-
sets generated in registered carbon sequestration projects. Using 
an experimental approach our paper tries to predict what offset 
selling behavior we may observe as this market expands. Will 
offset providers be maximizing profit and selling their carbon 
offsets at the climate exchange? Or will they opt for more altru-
istic actions and be donating or selling the offsets at a discount 
to environmental agencies and organizations?1
Environmental groups are large supporters of the carbon 
emissions cap-and-trade system (Shogren, 2002b). Currently 
they are participating in the market by buying allowances/off-
sets at the Climate Exchange and retiring them. The two exper-
iments discussed in this paper provide environmental groups 
with a reason for trying to work directly with carbon offsets pro-
viders. The experimental results show that such groups can go 
around the market and purchase offsets from the providers at 
prices discounted compared to the market price at the CCX.
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1 Jouvet et al. (1999) show that protecting the environment may be a mixture of altruistic and/or egoistic motives. A bequest motive is considered 
to be purely altruistic, whereas a cleaner environment also appeals to the egoistic person during their own lifetime. However, individuals can 
only have a marginal effect on CO2 world production, implying that decisions to retire carbon offsets are mostly of altruistic nature. Further, 
Popp (2001) shows that people care about future generations, also supporting arguments for the altruistic nature of monetary sacrifices to pro-
tect the environment.
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Experiments in environmental economics are on the border 
between market and non-market settings (Shogren, 2002a). Our 
experiments are unique in that they consider behavior of indi-
viduals across markets. More precisely, we compare the selling 
of offsets in the market and in the social environment. An ex-
perimental participant, playing the role of a hypothetical carbon 
offset provider, chooses whether she wants to sell her offsets at 
a discount to the environmental agency or at the market price at 
the Climate Exchange. Such a set-up allows for empathy–sym-
pathy-based environmentally conscious behavior, but also for 
egoistic–hedonistic, profit-maximizing actions of individuals in 
the ecological context.
Studies on individual environmental values in general demon-
strate the participant’s response to self-interest and shared other-
interest as reflected in other-regarding (shared) values (Rose et 
al., 2002; Sturm and Weimann, 2006). They also suggest that peo-
ple balance their pecuniary concerns with satisfying communal, 
shared goals and interests (Lynne, 2002; Lynne, 2006; Sautter et 
al., 2008; Czap and Ovchinnikova, 2008). The results of our ex-
periments point to an innate desire in our subjects to engage in a 
shared other-interest, other-regarding…perhaps better said, mu-
tual-regarding…behavior even without priming, and even in sit-
uations when such behavior is very costly to them.
The rest of the paper is constructed as follows. The next sec-
tion provides a brief review of approaches on how to measure 
individuals’ valuation of the environmental good. The following 
section discusses the results of the two experiments. The subse-
quent section offers conclusions and the final section presents 
limitations and future extensions.
2. Measurements of the individual valuation of environmen-
tal goods
There are several non-experimental and quasi-experimen-
tal approaches to the measurement of the individual valuation of 
environmental goods. In the direct contingent valuation method 
(see for example Mitchell et al., 1989; Loomis, 2006) a hypothetical 
situation is used to elicit willingness-to-pay (WTP) or willingness-
to-accept (WTA) for an environmental item. Indirect valuation 
methods include contingent behavior (e.g., Grijalva et al., 2002; 
Chase et al., 1998), and revealed preference approaches, in par-
ticular travel cost analysis (e.g., Knetsch, 1963; Buchli et al., 2003; 
Loomis, 2006), and hedonic pricing (e.g., Knetsch, 1964; Dale et al., 
1999; Nelson et al., 2005). Another possibility to elicit individual 
values is to perform choice experiments (e.g., Carlsson and Mar-
tinsson, 2001; Laury and Taylor, 2008). These approaches gener-
ally suffer from being either not incentive compatible or measur-
ing only part of the valuation of the environment.
The experimental approach to the measurement of environ-
mental valuation deals with social dilemma situations and em-
ploys public goods (PG) and common pool resources (CPR) 
games. These experiments are often decontextualized and use 
very neutral language in instructions and during the game. Such 
experiments demonstrate that the participant’s motives include 
not only the private value of the public goods, but also altruism, 
warm glow, and confusion (Rose et al., 2002). In addition, recent 
findings on public good donations (Laury and Taylor, 2008) sug-
gest that altruistic behavior of individuals in public choice ex-
periments does not necessarily translate into higher donations 
for the naturally occurring public (environmental) good. Intrigu-
ingly, Laury and Taylor (2008) showed that weak free-riders 
more often contribute to the naturally occurring public good. In 
this sense a contribution to the public good, which directly ben-
efits other group members, can be considered to be fundamen-
tally different from a contribution to the environmental good.
Controlled, decontextualized experiments on public goods 
provide participants with explicit information on the private 
value of such goods/resources. In contrast, attitude towards and 
the true evaluation of naturally occurring PGs are more difficult 
to capture, because they include the uncertainty regarding the 
private value of the environmental good (Rose et al., 2002). More 
importantly, environmental goods have an intrinsic value to in-
dividuals (Boyce et al., 1992), which makes them try to preserve 
a natural resource for moral and other motives. This is of particu-
lar interest in the context of global warming, as individuals must 
make a very personal decision on whether to make a contribution 
to the global PG or not, despite knowing that each individual con-
tribution is not going to make a substantial difference.
The two experiments presented in this paper draw on the hy-
pothetical contextualized contingent valuation and the incen-
tive-compatible experimental approaches. Both experiments 
ask individuals to imagine themselves as a farmer—carbon off-
set provider confronted with the decision to sell her carbon off-
sets. The offsets can be sold on the Climate Exchange at the mar-
ket price or to the environmental organization at a discount. The 
participants can pursue their profit-maximization and sell all 
their offsets at the exchange, or they may make environmentally 
conscious decision and sell offsets to the environmental group. 
They can also do both and thus achieve a kind of peace-of-mind 
from having done the right thing while also earning an adequate 
profit. By giving up higher profits and selling offsets to the con-
servancy project, participants are revealing their preferences for 
the shared environmental good.
The crucial point of both experiments is that the participant’s 
real earnings are the percentage of their game earnings. In this 
sense it is costly for a participant to reveal her preferences. The 
advantage of this approach compared to the traditional contin-
gent valuation analysis is that subjects do not have an incentive 
to overstate their true preferences with regard to the environmen-
tal good; however, they may want to understate their preferences. 
The advantage of this approach over the public goods experi-
ments is that participants are provided with an environmental 
context. This triggers participant’s intrinsic values and buy-in to 
shared social norms and thus provides higher external validity of 
our experiments relative to the traditional PG experiments.
In addition, the experiments developed in this paper draw on 
the research in behavioral economics and psychology. Research 
on farmer’s behavior has a long history of inclusion of the hu-
man dimension (Francis and King, 1997; Nowak and Korsching, 
1998), psychological constraints of such behavior (Lockeretz, 
1990; Luzar and Diagne, 1999), including subjective norms and 
environmental attitudes (Lynne et al., 1988; Lynne and Casey, 
1998; Sautter et al., 2008; Ovchinnikova and Czap, 2008). Usu-
ally, economic experiments do not report any type of demo-
graphic or psychological traits statistics. However, it was found 
that personality types have explanatory power in bargaining 
and prisoners dilemma games (Boone et al., 1999; Ben-Ner et al., 
2004; Swope et al., 2008) as well as common resource dilemmas 
(Koole et al., 2001). In this paper we include psychological traits 
questions measuring selfism, empathy, autism, and locus of con-
trol to test the degree to which these personality characteristics 
influence participants’ behavior.
3. Experiment 1—balancing behavior of carbon offset provid-
ers and its determinants
3.1. Experimental procedures
Seventy-eight students from the University of Nebraska-Lin-
coln participated in the experiment. The experiment was pro-
grammed and conducted on MediaLab. Upon the arrival at the 
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experimental laboratory subjects were seated in separate rooms 
with a computer terminal and presented with the instructions 
to the experiment (understanding was checked with a multiple 
choice quiz). The actual experiment took 20–40 min to complete; 
the mean earnings paid to subjects were 26.47 dollars (standard 
deviation 2.05) with a minimum of $21.40 and maximum of $30.
Subjects were paid a percentage of their experimental earn-
ings. By choosing this payment procedure over one round at 
random we wanted to capture the sequencing effect (in contrast 
to the usual procedure in choice experiments, i.e., Carlsson and 
Martinsson, 2001; Laury and Taylor, 2008) in the individual deci-
sions. As the metaeconomic theory (Lynne, 2006) suggests people 
often try to balance self-interest and shared other-interest in form-
ing their internalized own-interest. However this balance is not 
necessarily reflected in each particular decision, it rather happens 
within the multiplicity of decisions. Thus egoism may prevail in 
one situation, however the next time people may act with self-sac-
rifice (making the environmentally conscious decision) in the ego-
istic-based self-interest while they pursue the shared other-inter-
est (and vice versa). Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of three treatment conditions (26 subjects in each condition). Sub-
jects knew from the instructions that the game would proceed for 
“several rounds” but they were not aware of how many rounds 
they were actually going to play. The variation in the number of 
rounds (10 or 15) was used merely for randomization and is not a 
condition of interest. The first treatment is the shared other-inter-
est condition, in which participants were primed to behave coop-
eratively. In the self-interest condition they were urged to watch 
out for their self-interest. In the control condition no priming oc-
curred; subjects proceeded directly to the experiment.
Each participant received 2000 offsets at the beginning of 
each round. Each round consisted of two steps. The first step 
was the decision to sell offsets to either the Conservancy Proj-
ect2 (CP) or at the Viking Climate Exchange3 (VCX). Participants 
were provided with information on the prices offered by the CP 
and at the VCX for each offset. These prices were increased ev-
ery round as was the relative price difference. In the first round 
both buyers paid $1 per metric ton of offset, by the last (15th) 
round the VCX paid $8 whereas the CP paid only $3. After the 
subject indicated how much she wanted to sell to the CP and the 
VCX, she proceeded to the next screen showing her experimen-
tal and real payoff for that round.
The second step of each round involved answering questions 
on empathy, locus of control, autism, and selfism/narcissism4 
(one random question per scale, four in total).
The empathy scale was taken from the International Per-
sonality Item Pool (Goldberg et al., 2006). Answers on the scale 
were re-keyed so that higher numbers indicate more empathetic 
behavior. The locus of control scale was based on Rotter (1966). 
The answers were re-keyed in the way that the higher num-
bers on the scale mean more internal locus of control; in partic-
ular it indicates the personal belief that own actions determine 
the rewards. Low numbers on the scale represent more exter-
nal locus of control. It reflects the personal belief that own be-
havior does not matter much and that rewards in life are gen-
erally outside one’s own control. The autism scale was adapted 
from Baron-Cohen et al. (2001). It was re-keyed for the analysis 
so that higher numbers mean more autistic behavior. Finally the 
selfism/narcissism scale was developed based on Phares and 
Erskine (1984), with higher numbers indicating more selfish be-
havior. We found relatively low correlation between the scales 
allowing us to use the answers to all four of the psychological 
trait questions in the regression analysis.
After a subject finished all the rounds of the game she was 
invited to answer basic demographic questions. This completed 
the experiment.
3.2. Experimental results
Result 1: With the increase in the price premium for selling at the 
Viking Climate Exchange the average number of offsets sold to the 
Conservancy Project was decreasing, however it was still above 30 per-
cent even in the last rounds (Figure 1). This is consistent with the 
theoretical discussion on preference functions as provided by 
Altman (2006). He argues that an increase in the price premium 
increases the opportunity cost of selling to the CP, which, given 
a not completely altruistic person, should result in an increase in 
the allocation of offsets to the CP. Our results offer an additional 
insight to his model in that there is not only a minimum level in 
the pecuniary dimension (he calls it physiological minimum or, 
alternatively, socially determined target income), but also a min-
imum level in the moral, other oriented dimension.
There was no significant difference found between the pro-
portions of offsets sold to the CP in the three treatments when 
compared by round. Similarly, when comparing the average 
contribution across all rounds there was also no significant dif-
ference between treatments.5 An intriguing observation is that 
the proportion of offsets sold to CP in the shared other-interest 
condition was slightly higher than in the other two conditions 
until round 10. In that round the proportion dropped and stayed 
below the self-interest condition in the remaining rounds.
Although statistically insignificant this suggests that people 
may have some sort of understanding of how much one ought 
to sell to the CP on average. In the first ten rounds subjects in 
the shared other-interest condition sold a little bit more to the 
CP than subjects in the self-interest condition. Later, however 
they may have recognized the necessity to turn to the self-inter-
est and starting from round 11 they decreased the share going to 
the CP and ended up selling less to CP than players in the self-
interest condition. Such decisions, though, did come at a cost to 
subjects. After the experiment they were commenting in private 
conversations that with the price difference increasing it was 
very hard to continue selling offsets to the CP. One participant 
2 Standing for an environmental group; e.g. the Sierra Club.
3 Standing for a carbon exchange market; e.g. the Chicago Climate Exchange.
4 For the complete scales please contact the authors.
5 Average proportion of offsets sold to the CP under the self-interest condition is 0.57; under other-interest condition is 0.58; under the control con-
dition is 0.56.
Figure 1. Average proportion of offsets sold to the Conservancy Proj-
ect in Experiment 1.
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even said that she did not want to be selling her soul.6 The pro-
portion of offsets sold to the CP in the control condition was be-
tween the other- and self-interest conditions in rounds 1–10 and 
thus almost coincided with the overall average (average of all 
three conditions). In the last five rounds the control condition 
average closely followed the other-interest condition (Figure 1).
To establish the determinants of the individuals’ selling be-
havior a regression analysis was conducted for the proportion of 
offsets sold to the CP (dependent variable: prop_cp) using a gen-
eralized linear model. The first specification (Model 1A in Table 
1) did not include the previous round as an independent vari-
able, whereas the second specification (Model 1B) did.
Both Models, 1A and 1B, were constructed on the basis of the 
full data set (15 rounds). To check for robustness we constructed 
two additional models based on the first ten rounds only. Re-
sults were very similar.
All the regression coefficients have expected signs. The price 
premium of the Viking Climate Exchange over the Conservancy 
Project (px_pc) has an economically significant negative effect on 
the amount of offsets being sold to the CP. For every one dol-
lar increase in the price premium, the share of offsets sold to the 
CP decreases by 8 percentage points. Intriguingly, the subjects 
are responding to the priming for other-interest (d_other) but not 
for self-interest (d_self). This is economically quite significant as 
the environmental agency can considerably increase its’ share 
(in this case by 5 percentage points) by appealing to the environ-
mental consciousness of the offset providers.
Result 2: Psychological scales have significant predictive power for 
environmentally conscientious behavior. As expected, higher levels 
of empathy made subjects contribute more to the CP, whereas 
higher internal locus of control, autism, and selfism/narcissism 
reduced the amount of offsets sold to the Conservancy Project. 
Responding to psychological scales after each selling decision 
encouraged participants to reflect on their personalities and the 
way they wish to be treated by others. It is important to stress 
the economic relevance of these effects, as the coefficients on 
empathy and locus of control are both about fifty percent larger 
than the coefficient on the price premium. Autism and selfism 
are less important, but still account for about five percentage 
points of the overall allocation (equivalent to a more than a sixty 
cent increase in the price premium).
An increase in the price premium was a powerful disin-
centive to continue selling offsets to the CP, however the price 
changes per se may not necessarily be the sole cause for changes 
in selling behavior each round. To estimate the effect of past de-
cisions we included the proportion of offsets sold by the partici-
pant to CP in the previous round (prop_cp_lag-1) into the model 
(Model 1B). Including this variable renders the experimental 
manipulations insignificant. However, the psychological dis-
positions (except autism) remained statistically significant pre-
dictors of the willingness to sell to the Conservancy Project at a 
low price. Here we observe the tradeoff between pecuniary in-
centives and non-pecuniary factors. Controlling for the previous 
behavior, the price premium becomes less economically impor-
tant in explaining the individual behavior than the psychologi-
cal traits of empathy and locus of control.
Result 3: There is hysteresis in giving. An increase in contri-
bution in the previous round causes individuals to also have a 
higher than average share going to the Conservancy Project in 
the next round, as demonstrated by the highly significant and 
positive coefficient on the proportion of offsets sold to the CP 
in the previous round (prop_cp_lag-1). This mean reverting pro-
cess is economically quite essential, as subjects carry more than 
70 percent of the increase over to the next round. One possible 
explanation for this observation is that there may be some spill-
over warm glow effect. Subjects deciding to sacrifice some prof-
its to sell to the CP may feel good about doing-the-right-thing 
and may be compelled to do so in the next round as well. At the 
same time they feel that they cannot completely sacrifice their 
own interest and slowly move back to the “equilibrium” posi-
tion of inner balance between self- and other-interest.
4. Experiment 2—price changes and altruism of carbon offsets 
providers
4.1. Experimental procedures
Sixty students of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln partic-
ipated in the experiment. The procedure was similar to the one 
described for Experiment 1. The experiment took 15–20 min to 
complete. Subjects received 0.017% of their experimental earn-
ings as payment. The mean payoff equaled $18.46 (standard 
deviation $2.18) with a minimum of $12.41 and a maximum of 
$21.17. As before, participants of the experiment were randomly 
assigned to one of the treatments (30 subjects in each of the price 
increase and price decrease condition).
Experiment 2 had the following modifications compared 
to Experiment 1: participants played 25 rounds, psychological 
traits questions were not asked, and a new pricing schedule was 
implemented. In this pricing schedule only one price (of the Vi-
king Climate Exchange or Conservancy Project) was changing 
each round. The new pricing schedule included two conditions: 
price increase and price decrease.
In the price increase condition prices of both buyers equal $1 
per metric ton of carbon offsets in round 1. Starting from round 2 
the price at the VCX increases by 10% each round until it reaches 
$3.14 in round 13. The price of the Conservancy Project is kept 
constant at $1. Starting from round 14 the price of VCX is fro-
zen at the level of $3.14 while the CP price increases by 10% each 
round until it equates to the VCX price of $3.14 in round 25.
In the price decrease condition prices of VCX and CP started 
at the high level—$3.14 per metric ton of carbon offset in round 
Table 1. GLM (maximum likelihood) for Experiment 1: dependent 
variable prop_cp (proportion of offsets sold to the Conservancy 
Project)a.
Variable                                    Model 1A       Model 1B
Constant 1.072*** .340***
px_pc −.080*** −.009*
Prop_cp_lag-1  .738***
D_other .048** .019
D_self −.008 −.005
D_rd10 .005 −.003
Empathy .124*** .040***
Controlb −.127*** −.055***
Autism −.050*** −.018
Selfism −.047*** −.017*
Akaike’s info criterionc 431.432 −348.313
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sq. 280.900 986.929
Sig. in Omnibus testd .000 .000
a Demographic characteristics were controlled for.
b Internal locus of control.
c Information criteria are in small-is-better form.
d Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
6 Which is where the title of our paper is coming from.
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1. In rounds 2–13 the CP was decreasing its price by 10% per 
round until it reached $1. The price at the VCX was kept con-
stant at $3.14. In rounds 14–25 the VCX price was decreasing by 
10% while the CP price remained the same. In round 25 prices of 
both buyers equated at the low $1-level.
This pricing schedule was designed to examine: first, the re-
action of subjects to the change in each price separately, keep-
ing the other price constant; second, the difference in the ef-
fect of decreasing prices and increasing prices (with the same 
change in the price premium); third, the tolerable level of price 
premium for which subjects would still sell to the Conservancy 
Project. This is intended to determine the willingness-to-pay for 
the protection of the environment. In the earlier rounds it is not 
very costly for the participants to sell their offsets to the environ-
mental agency. As the price premium paid by the VCX over the 
CP increases (rounds 2–13) it becomes more and more tempt-
ing to maximize the individual pecuniary payoff and sell a sig-
nificant proportion of offsets on the VCX. The subsequent de-
crease in the price premium (in rounds 14–25) allows examining 
whether the behavior reverts back to the corresponding levels in 
earlier rounds.
4.2. Experimental results
In line with our expectations the proportion of offsets sold to 
the Conservancy Project followed the dynamics of the price pre-
mium. In both, the Price Increase and the Price Decrease con-
dition, the proportion allocated to the Conservancy Project de-
creases until about round 13 and then rises (Figure 2 and Figure 
3). However, the proportion of offsets sold to the CP did not get 
back to the initial levels.
Result 4: There is no significant difference between the proportion 
of offsets sold to the Conservancy Project in the Price Increase and 
Price Decrease condition with equal price premiums. We matched 
one round in the Price Increase condition to the respective 
round in the Price Decrease condition with the same price pre-
mium. For instance round 2 of the Price Increase condition was 
matched with round 24 of the Price Decrease condition (in both 
cases the price premium was $0.1). We hypothesized that there 
would be two possible effects working in opposite directions 
for the difference in proportions. The first effect is loss aver-
sion: we expect that the proportion of offsets sold to CP will 
be lower in the Price Decrease condition since subjects may 
find it harder selling at a lower price to CP when their prof-
its are falling already. The second effect is warm glow (Andre-
oni, 1990): we expect that the proportion of offsets sold to CP 
will be higher in later rounds because subjects may feel good 
about doing-the-right-thing by selling to the CP, which rein-
forces their desire to sell more in the next round. The absence 
of a significant difference would signify that both effects can-
cel each other out.
A two-factor ANOVA demonstrated that there is no signifi-
cant difference between the proportion of offsets sold to CP in 
two conditions (given equal price premiums), with the exception 
of two rounds. Thus, in general we can assert that the influence 
of loss aversion and possible warm glow cancel each other out.
Comparing the results of the first and second experiment we 
observe that in Experiment 2 the proportion falls below the level 
found in Experiment 1. One possible explanation of this is that 
during Experiment 1 subjects were asked psychological questions 
after each round. Two out of four questions asked were targeted 
at empathetic concerns and altruism, which may have positively 
affected the subsequent decision regarding selling offsets (see 
Section 6). Another explanation is that answering the questions 
required time and attention and thus separated selling decisions 
in two consequent rounds. Some participants may have forgot-
ten the previous prices and/or selling decision. In this sense the 
selling decision in Experiment 1 could have been more indepen-
dent of the decision in the previous round whereas in Experiment 
2 participants were observing screens with prices in more rapid 
succession and might have inferred the pattern of price changes.
In the econometric model we included prices offered at the 
VCX and by the CP separately. The coefficients of the general-
ized linear models (Table 2) are statistically significant and have 
the expected signs. Every dollar increase in price proposed by 
the Conservancy Project (price_CP) increases the proportion of 
offsets sold to the CP by 0.16 (Model 2F). The effect of the price 
at the Viking Climate Exchange (price_VCX) is negative, but 
Figure 2. Average proportion of offsets sold to the Conservancy Proj-
ect in the Price Increase condition in Experiment 2.
Figure 3. Average proportion of offsets sold to the Conservancy Proj-
ect in the Price Decrease condition in Experiment 2.
Table 2. GLM (maximum likelihood) for Experiment 2: dependent vari-
able prop_cp (proportion of offsets sold to the Conservancy Project)a.
Variable                                     Model 2F                 Model 2G
Constant .449*** .190***
Price_CP .161*** .061***
Price_VCX −.130*** −.051***
Prop_cp_lag-1  .707***
d_other .001 .001
d_self −.073*** −.017
d_pr incr .018 −.002
d_pr prem_incr .036** −.074***
d_1st round .427*** 
d_25thround .327*** 
Akaike’s info criterionb 733.802 −226.298
Likelihood Ratio Chi-sq. 423.197 1219.846
Sig. in Omnibus testc .000 .000
a Demographic characteristics were controlled for.
b Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.
c Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
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relatively smaller than that of the price of the CP. This is consis-
tent with the theoretical discussion by Altman (2006). A simulta-
neous increase in both prices increases the subject’s income for a 
given allocation of offsets. As predicted theoretically, this leads 
to increased willingness to sacrifice in the pecuniary domain.
In contrast to the first experiment priming for shared other-
interest (d_other) does not make a significant difference here, 
however priming for self-interest (d_self) decreases the propor-
tion of offsets sold by the individual to the Conservancy Project.
The dummy for the price increase condition (d_pr_incr) is not 
significant, but the dummy for the price premium increase rela-
tive to the previous round (d_pr_prem_incr = 1 for rounds 2–13) 
is statistically significant and economically moderately impor-
tant. In rounds 1 and 25 prices offered at the VCX and by the CP 
are equal. In this case it is not costly for an individual to behave 
environmentally conscious and sell offsets to the Conservancy 
Project. Therefore we may expect that the coefficients in front 
of the dummies for the first (d_1stround) and twenty fifth round 
(d_25thround) would be roughly the same. However in the esti-
mated model they differ by 0.1. As the price premium of VCX 
compared to CP decreased, participants were selling higher pro-
portion of offset to the CP, however, the proportion did not get 
all the way back to the initial level. This supports the notion that 
decisions in previous rounds have an impact on subsequent 
rounds. Furthermore, the size of the coefficients for rounds 1 
and 25 is comparatively large, indicating that there is a spike in 
the willingness to support the environmental initiative.
Similar to the analysis of the first experiment, Model 2G ad-
dresses the question of hysteresis of past selling decision on the 
current round. The coefficient of the proportion of offsets sold 
to CP in a previous round (d_prop_cp_lag-1) is slightly lower in 
Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, however it is still economi-
cally highly significant at above 0.7. The introduction of path de-
pendency reduces the influence of both prices, but they remain 
economically relevant determinants of individual actions. Other 
variables in the model are not significant, except the dummy for 
the increase in the price premium (d_pr_prem_incr). In rounds 2–
13 when the price premium rises, it becomes relatively costly to 
be environmentally conscious. Participants respond by selling 
less offsets to the Conservancy Project, presumably to protect 
their profits from falling.
5. Effect of psychological traits on individual behavior: 
comparison of Experiment 1 and 2
In order to compare the results of the first and the second ex-
periment we run a new set of estimations using a generalized 
linear regression model with (Models 1I and 2I in Table 3 using 
data from Experiment 1 and 2, respectively) and without 
(Models 1H and 2H) the previous round as an independent vari-
able. This allows us to observe the strength and robustness of 
the relationship between the price premium of VCX over CP 
and the proportion of offsets sold to the CP as well as the effect 
of asking psychological questions.
Models 1H and 2H have similar intercepts (Constant) for the 
proportion sold to the CP: 58–65 percent of offsets. Our manip-
ulation of playing 10 or 15 rounds in Experiment 1 and Price In-
crease vs. Price Decrease conditions is not significant for the sell-
ing behavior of offset providers and is therefore not included in 
these models.
Result 5: The effect of the price premium (px-pc) is more pro-
nounced in Experiment 2 (Model 2H) as compared to Experiment 1 
(Model 1H). In the former the coefficient of the price premium 
equals −0.205 whereas it is only −.081 in the latter. This is likely 
due to the difference in the design of the experiment. Whereas 
each round in Experiment 1 was separated by psychological 
questions these questions were not asked in Experiment 2. It sug-
gests that the constant reflections on one’s actions through for instance 
empathetic concerns and thoughts about one’s selfism and control have 
a positive effect on individual contributions to the environmental good. 
Previous research (Carlsson et al., 2004) shows that the inclusion 
of prices changes preferences by decreasing the importance of 
attributes associated with emotive ethical concerns. Our estima-
tion demonstrates that the stress on the self-reflections on “who 
I am” and “how do I treat others” decreases the impact of prices 
on individual choices. This is consistent with metaeconomics, 
where such stirring/irritating of subjects to “think-about-it” 
brings about truly rational choices; choices that integrate and 
balance over the I & We, self- and shared other-interest.
Result 6: The effect of priming for shared other-interest (d_other) is 
significant in Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2. At the same time 
priming for the self-interest (d_self) made an economic difference in 
Experiment 2, but not in Experiment 1 (the coefficient is less than half 
in Experiment 1 compared to the coefficient in Experiment 2). These 
two outcomes basically speak to the same idea as in the previ-
ous paragraph that the self-reflections on “who I am” and “how 
do I wish to be treated by (and how, then, I will treat) others” 
elucidate the importance of environmental concerns and, en-
couraged by the other-interest priming, results in a higher pro-
portion of offsets sold to the Conservancy Project in Experiment 
1. In contrast, making uninterrupted selling decisions in Exper-
iment 2 leads to more habitual, more primary profit seeking ac-
tions. Further encouraging self-interest results consequently in a 
relatively low proportion sold to the CP in Experiment 2.
Similar to Result 4 above, it was found that the regression coef-
ficients of the proportion of offsets sold to the CP in the previous 
round (prop_cp(lag-1)) are both positive, economically and statisti-
cally significant, and very close in magnitude. This outlines once 
again the importance of hysteresis of the individual decisions. In-
triguingly, the introduction of the past proportion into the regres-
sion equation in Experiment 1 (Model 1I as compared to Model 
1H) overrides the effect of the price premium change (the coeffi-
cient in front of pc_px becomes very small and statistically insig-
nificant). In Experiment 2, however, this does not happen. The co-
efficient of the price premium in Model 2I (as compared to Model 
2H) decreases but stays economically and statistically significant.
6. Discussion and environmental policy implications
The estimation of experimental results strongly supports that 
the price premium is a significant determinant of the proportion 
of offsets being sold to the environmental agency. An increase in 
the price premium at the climate exchange over the environmen-
tal agency leads to an increase in the share sold at the climate ex-
Table 3. GLM (maximum likelihood) comparing Experiment 1 and 2: 
dependent variable prop_cp (proportion of offsets sold to the Conser-
vancy Project).
Variable                            Model 1H     Model 1I    Model 2H     Model 2I
Constant .649*** .080*** .578*** .170***
px_pc −.081*** −.005 −.205*** −.063***
Prop_cp_lag-1  .792***  .692***
d_other .062** .023 .012 .004
d_self .026 .009 −.056*** −.014
Akaike’s info criteriona 588.535 −329.070 881.032 −196.005
Likelihood ratio Chi-sq. 105.797 947.685 257.967 1175.553
Sig. in Omnibus testb .000 .000 .000 .000
a Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.
b Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
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change. The good news is, however, that there is a powerful intrinsic 
motivation for individuals to protect the environment.  Even if prices 
are more than 300% higher at the climate exchange, still about 
ten percent of offsets are sold to the environmental agency (thirty 
percent in Experiment 1). This implies that environmental groups 
can purchase offsets at a significant discount. Conversely, people 
care also about economic performance and try to balance the allo-
cation of offsets. This became apparent in the cases in which the 
price premium was zero and the proportion of the offsets sold at 
the climate exchange still reached ten percent.
Important for environmental groups is the result that the im-
pact of a change in price offered by the environmental group on the 
share allocated to the environmental group is larger than the impact 
of a change in price offered at the climate exchange. This implies 
that the environmental group has some leverage that it can use 
in their purchasing decisions in the market. The key will be in 
keeping the issue before the sellers, stimulating them to con-
sciously reconsider, and, then, rationally choose to sell more off-
sets to the environmental group.
Psychological traits are important predictors of individual behavior 
in the environmental context. The influence of empathy and locus 
of control dominates the pecuniary incentives represented by 
prices. Furthermore, we found that the very fact of asking sub-
jects to reflect on their life attitudes significantly increases (more 
than twice) the proportion of offsets sold to the environmental 
agency. As alluded to above, this suggests that an effective way 
for promoting the cause of environmental interest groups is to 
combine advertising campaigns with targeted questionnaires 
asking offset providers to reflect on their belief structure and 
their attitudes regarding environmental protection.
The effect of priming for shared other-interest was found to be 
significant in the first experiment. Priming for self-interest made 
a difference in the second experiment. Based on the argument in 
the previous paragraph this can be explained in that the self-reflec-
tion questions in the first experiment stress the environmental concerns 
and enhance the impact of the priming for the shared other-interest. In 
the second experiment these questions were not asked and selling 
decisions occurred in rapid succession, which may have stressed 
profit-maximizing behavior, and thus resulted in relatively low 
proportion sold to the environmental groups. This implies that 
environmental agencies could increase their market share by run-
ning an advertising campaign about societal attitudes and how 
much others contributed. In conjunction with the targeted ques-
tionnaires mentioned before, this could provide a significant in-
crease in offsets sold to environmental groups.
In both Experiment 1 and 2 subjects displayed hysteresis of 
behavior in the sense that high contributions to the environment 
in the past tended to result in higher contributions in the future. 
This suggests that high “one-time” contributions are preferable for en-
vironmental groups7 as they tend to motivate subjects to make higher 
subsequent contributions.
7. Conclusion
In the U.S. the carbon dioxide emission allowances market 
and the related carbon offsets market is just now being devel-
oped. Our paper tries to predict what selling behavior for car-
bon offsets we may observe as this market expands. In partic-
ular we ran two experiments addressing the question whether 
carbon offset providers will be maximizing their profit and sell-
ing their carbon offsets at the climate exchange or if they will 
be following environmental concerns and be donating or selling 
the offsets at a discount to environmental agencies. In addition 
we tested for psychological dispositions as a determinant for al-
truistic behavior of carbon offset providers.
The two experiments provided in this paper combine a con-
textualized, hypothetical approach to estimate the individ-
ual value of environmental good and a context-free, induced 
value experimental approach. The decisions made by partici-
pants were strongly connected to monetary incentives—taking 
decisions with the intention of protecting the environment was 
costly. At the same time our contextual experiments partially are 
able to address the commonly criticized low external validity of 
abstract laboratory experiments (Sturm and Weimann, 2006).
Our experiments are also related to the work done on the tes-
tbedding of institutional arrangements to solve environmen-
tal problems. To our knowledge the two experiments discussed 
in this paper are the first attempts to take a look at the selling 
side of carbon offsets. Previous experiments have explored per-
mit markets by designing auctions for the initial distributions of 
emission allowances and by setting up emission trading schemes 
(Sturm and Weimann, 2006). The two experiments in this paper 
are elucidating the attitudes and behavior of carbon offsets pro-
viders who have not yet entered the market.
An additional difference between our paper and other exper-
iments presented in the literature is that our experiments con-
sider behavior of individuals across markets. More precisely, 
our study compares the selling of offsets in the market context 
and in the social environment. Our experiments deepen the as-
sertion of Shogren (2002a) that environmental experiments deal 
with non-market and socialized market settings: a participant 
has a choice to sell her offsets to the environmental agency or on 
the exchange.
Furthermore, contrary to the general practice of encourag-
ing and stimulating rational and self-interested behavior, our 
experiments were encouraging self-reflection, shared other-
interest, thinking of communal norms, and environmental 
consciousness.
There is a parallel in our paper to the current U.S. practice 
with respect to the carbon allowances market. The Chicago Cli-
mate Exchange is a completely voluntarily system with self-en-
forced actions of environmentally conscious companies. Sim-
ilarly, in our experiments participants are making decisions 
about voluntarily forgoing profits. These decisions are not ob-
served, enforced, induced, and even do not have well-defined 
incentives except for the feeling of doing-the-right-thing. The 
fact that these decisions are costly to subjects makes the results 
particularly strong.
While the findings of this study are tentative we can expect 
that the willingness to contribute to environmental groups will 
increase over time. As Krutilla (1967) argued, there is an inelas-
tic supply of environmental goods. With technological progress, 
the supply of other goods increases over time, which increases 
the relative scarcity and thus price of the environmental good. In 
addition there is a shift of preference towards the environmen-
tal good through a learning-by-doing effect (i.e. people learn to 
enjoy outdoor activities). This will further increase the relative 
price and valuation of environmental goods.
Finally, both experiments provide general support for the 
overall metaeconomic framework, especially for its three most 
fundamental features. First, subjects in the experiments dem-
onstrated overall tendencies to seek balance within their own-
interests as between the egoistic–hedonistic pursuit of material 
gain and the empathy–sympathy-based pursuit of shared other-
interest as reflected in providing an environmental good. Sec-
ond, subjects were willing to sacrifice more in one domain or 
the other as they oriented and reoriented their interests in go-
ing through the various phases of each experiment, giving new 
meaning to the notion of altruism, as metaeconomics proposes. 
Third, by stirring their thought processes in the priming and 
7 Compared to continuous small contributions.
228 Ov c h i n n i k O v a e t a l.  i n Jo u r n a l o f So c i o-Ec o n o m i c S  38 (2009) 
the psychological questioning, we stirred rational consideration 
and reconsideration, moving choice out of the domain of only 
intuition-based habitual behavior, within which the pursuit of 
self-interest is likely more primal, as the play of the experiment 
evolved. By stirring thought, this self-interest is tempered and 
conditioned by the consideration of shared other-interest, lead-
ing to a truly rational choice. We hope these findings stimulate 
more efforts in helping further test, build and elaborate the me-
taeconomics approach and framework.
8. Limitations and future extensions
In both experiments we assumed that transaction costs are 
the same for selling offsets at the climate exchange and directly 
to the environmental agency. However, in real life we may ex-
pect that selling directly to an environmental group would im-
ply less transaction costs, especially for a small farmer who 
would not need to join the Offset Aggregator. While this will not 
change our qualitative results it may change the exact response 
that we will observe in the real marketplace to factors that we 
have determined as significant.
Participants in these two experiments were undergraduate 
and graduate students who were asked to imagine themselves 
in the place of farmers and carbon offsets providers. The mag-
nitude of the experimental results may be affected by the choice 
of subjects. However, we believe that the difference between the 
decisions of our subject pool and actual farmers is rather small. 
Our belief is grounded on two points. First, we not only pro-
vided detailed instructions explaining the context, and the po-
tential effect of their choice on the environment, but we also 
quizzed subjects on their understanding of the instructions. Due 
to the nature of the university, a high proportion of students 
come from farm families, have relatives who are farmers, or are 
somehow connected to the agricultural land. Therefore a large 
part of our subject pool was not unfamiliar with the background 
of the experiment. Second, the literature on the context of in-
duced-value experiments (Dyer et al., 1989; Smith et al., 1988), 
voting responses in hypothetical and real referenda (Bjornstad 
et al., 1997; Cummings and Taylor, 1998; Cummings and Taylor, 
1999; Taylor, 1998), and contributions to an environmental proj-
ect (Maguire et al., 2003) found that the behavior of student and 
adult subjects are statistically similar in hypothetical and real 
surveys, and experiments.
Our results could have been affected by the fact that the ex-
periment was largely hypothetical. By making an environmen-
tally conscious decision and selling offsets to the environmen-
tal agency, subjects were only indicating/voting with their 
money for their choice, but not actually making a contribu-
tion to improve the environment. There was a possibility that 
the subject might have decided that her decision to sell offsets 
to the Conservancy Project, and thus indicating that she cares 
about the environment, is not worth the forgone earnings, be-
cause such decision would not affect the environment. So in 
this particular situation she might have chosen to sell all off-
sets to the Climate Exchange to avoid the decrease in profits. If, 
however, she believed that her sacrifice of the earnings would 
have a positive effect on the environment she might have cho-
sen to sell more offsets to the Conservancy Project. Thus the re-
sults of our experiments may have suffered from a downward 
bias. This further strengthens our results in the sense that if the 
decisions were not hypothetical, but real, we could have ob-
served even higher proportions of offsets sold to the Conser-
vancy Project.
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